Abstract. Bent function plays an important role in cryptography. It opposes an optimum resistance to linear and differential cryptanalysis. We point out that for some kinds of bent functions, such as Maiorana-McFarland functions and functions with algebraic degree less than three, they are weak in second-order differential cryptanalysis. Thus when constructing bent functions we should use other methods and avoid these functions. Furthermore, a bent function can split into four bent pieces if and only if, the corresponding second-order differential of its dual function is 1.
INTRODUCTION
In the mathematical field of combinatorics, a bent function is a special type of Boolean function. Defined and named in the 1960s by Oscar Rothaus in research not published until 1976( [1] ), bent functions are so called because they are as different as possible from all linear and affine functions. They have been extensively studied for their applications in cryptography, but have also been applied to spread spectrum, coding theory, and combinatorial design. The definition can be extended in several ways, leading to different classes of generalized bent functions keeping many of the useful properties of the original.
In cryptography, higher-order differential cryptanalysis is a generalization of differential cryptanalysis, an attack against block ciphers. Developed in 1994 by Lars Knudsen([2] ), the technique has been applied to a number of ciphers. Whereas ordinary differential cryptanalysis analyzes the differences between two texts, the higherorder variant considers differences between differences, etc. It has been shown to be more powerful than a firstorder attack in some cases (see KN-Cipher).
II.
At first we give the definition of Walsh transform for Boolean functions, which is one of the most important tools for researching the cryptography of Boolean functions.
Denote n B Boolean functions of n variables. 
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According to Theorem 2.1, it is easy to get:
the case of ( ) Furthermore, is there any relationship between restriction and second differential, which seems not obvious?
This part will give a positive answer to all these questions. Definition 3.1. Assume n f x x  is: 
( ,1)
The second statement is easy to prove. 
2 ( 1) In general, second-order differential cryptanalysis is effective only for functions degree less than 2(i.e. constant, linear, and quadratic functions). However, for bent functions, which are best under (first-order) differential cryptanalysis, the degree it can effectively attack can be enlarged to less than 3. 
VI. CONCLUSION
From our result, when constructing bent functions, we should use some other methods and avoid these functions. Some other known primary constructions of bent functions are:
partial spreads class( [5] , [6] ); trace of power functions on 2 n F ([5] , [7] , [8] ); F  of almost bent functions( [9] ); restrictions of functions on a hyperplane( [10] ).
